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The South African government•s policy of granting
"independence" to the black reserves within its borders evoked
considerable initial interest, particularly with regard to
Transkei, the first black territory to be so blessed. Liberal
writers approached the so-called "homelands" with sympathy, giving
serious consideration to their possible viability, and exploring
their potential as an engine for future change. Three well-known
American academics went so far as to dub Transkei as "virtually the
only ground where Africans can voice non-violent opposition to (the
South African) regime.nl More radical analysts dismissed such
arguments as politically obtuse. They were more interested in the
role of the new black middle classes who had inherited the
privileges which white traders and civil servants had formerly
enjoyed. "This class - co-opted already in conception - has ..
vested interest .. in the maintenance of White capitalist
domination in Southern Africa," declared Frank Molteno.2
G.Carter, T.Karis and N.Stultz, South Africa's Transkei
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), p.12. Other works
in this tradition include J.Butler, R.Rotberg and J-Adams, The
Black Homelands of South Africa: the Political and Economic
Development of Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1977), and N.Stultz, Transkei's Half Loaf (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).
* F.Molteno, "The Historical Significance of the Bantustan
Strategy," Social Dynamics (Cape Town), 3 (1977), p.25.
But once the homelands had become a firmly established feature
of the South African political scene, there was a considerable
decline in analytical interest. If we except KwaZulu and Chief
Gatsha Buthelezi, a figure of national significance, then the last
fully documented study of any South African homeland has been Roger
Southall's South Africa's Transkei, which was published in 1982.3
And even though the homelands have yielded numerous case studies
with regard to health, education, ethnicity and gender issues, very
little has appeared in the past decade on their political evolution
since "self-government" and/or "independence." Writers such as
Keenan and Harries have published occasional papers on
Bophuthatswana and Gazankulu. Students and political action
groups have produced poorly distributed ephemera on Venda and
KwaNdebele. The only accessible profile of Kenneth Mopeli, Qwa
Qwa's long-serving leader, is still the one in Joseph Lelyveldfs
R.Southall, South Africa's Transkei: the Political Economy
of an 'Independent' Bantustan (London: Heinemann Educational Books,
1977) .
* J. Keenan, "Pandora's Box; the private accounts of a
Bantustan community authority," in South African Research Service,
South African Review 3 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986); J.
Keenan, "Counter-Revolution as Reform: Struggle in the Bantustans,"
in Popular Strugglesin South Africa, eds. W.Cobbet and R.Cohen
(London: James Currey, 1988). P. Harries, "
n
 in The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (London: James
Currey, 1989).
5
 Transkei Rural Action Committee, KwaNdebele. the Struggle
aagainst 'Independence' (Johannesburg: Transvaal Rural Action
Committee, n.d. [1986?]); M.S. Badat, "Profile of a Bantustan:
Venda," in South African Research Service, Homeland Tragedy:
Function and Farce (Johannesburg, 1982).
Move Your Shadow.6 On the major homelands of Lebowa (pop. 2
million) and KaNgwane (pop: 550,000) one cannot find anything at
all.
Empirical neglect has been parallelled by analytical neglect,
so that one is hard put to find more than one theoretical article
in the past decade on any aspect of the homelands.7 Even the wave
of army coups and attempted coups between 1987 and 1990 have
escaped without any kind of detailed analysis. It is probably safe
to say that most outsiders assume that their own ignorance of any
internal changes within the homelands is a reflection of the fact
that nothing much has changed.
But, on the contrary, some very astounding reversals have
taken place, the significance of which has been largely ignored
outside the homelands themselves. The most dramatic of these has
taken place in Transkei, until recently a model apartheid homeland
under the firm control of Kaiser Matanzima, Dr Verwoerd's most
sincere black disciple. Today, Transkei is ruled by General Bantu
Holomisa, whom the South African Foreign Minister has called the
African National Congress's strongest supporter in the whole of
* New York: Times Books, 1985, p.140.
The one article is Johan Graaff,"Towards an understanding of
bantustan politics," in The Political Economy of South Africa, Ed.
N.Nattrass and E.Ardington (Cape Town: Oxford University Press,
1990) .
Africa.' Less dramatic certainly, but equally galling to the South
African government, was the behaviour of six other homeland leaders
who pulled out of important talks scheduled with President F.W. de
Klerk in April 1990, at the ANC's behest.
These events have made a mockery of the conventional wisdom
that the homelands are far too economically dependent on the South
African government to turn against it. It is a lesson that the
government itself has been quick to absorb. As late as 1987, they
were still attempting to force 'independence' down the throat of
KwaNdebele. By August 1991, however, the National Party Congress
concluded that the homeland policy should be abandoned. The context
of this announcement implies that this volte-face was less a
spontaneous concession than a retreat in the face of the collapse
of the homeland system. It could even be argued that this collapse
was one of the major considerations which prompted the "reform"
initiatives of President de Klerk.
It is naturally impossible for me to give a comprehensive
account of the entire collapse within the limits of a single paper.
My object is the more modest one of relating the hitherto
uncompiled history of the Transkei and Ciskei 'independent'
homelands which spearheaded the process. By implosion, I do not
mean to denote a catastrophe of literally astrophysical
8
 R»F. Botha, on South African television, 23 Nov. 1990
proportions. I merely use the word to imply comparison with the
physical process whereby a weakness at the centre is unable to
support the outer facade of a structure and results in its inward
collapse. The weakness at the centre may be found in the
disjuncture between the homeland leadership and the homeland
bourgeoisie, who might have constituted their local class base. I
will return to this subject in my conclusion.
X: Transkei - From Matanzima to Holomisa
The Last Days of the Matanzimas
The Transkei was the first black homeland to receive "self-
government" (1963) and the first to take "independence" (1976)J
If the homeland policy was going to succeed anywhere, it was going
to succeed in Transkei. Transkei possesses about the same land area
(4.4 million hectares) and the same population (3.5 million) as
Latvia and Estonia combined. With two minor exceptions, it is
geographically coherent and, unlike all the other homelands, it is
not inextricably economically interlinked with any specific South
African city. Local government is in the hands of powerful and
conservative chiefs, and the tiny educated elite either work for
the Transkei government or have acquired trading licenses through
its good offices. There were no trade unions in Transkei before
There is a considerable literature on Transkei during the
reign of Kaiser Matanzima (1963-1986). The most comprehensive
treatment is Southall, South Africa's Transkei.
1989, and the political repression was so severe that it was the
only part of South Africa where the United Democratic Front was
unable to establish itself. Above all, Transkei (and South Africa)
possessed in the person of Prime Minister (later President) Kaiser
Matanzima a true believer in the policy of territorial apartheid,
a man who once declared that "Dr Verwoerd was sent by God to
liberate the black people of South Africa."10 The geographical
isolation of Transkei, its rural character, its economic
backwardness, and the greed and prosperity of its educated elite,
all combined to create a climate where Transkei independence seemed
a great deal more than a bad joke.
The wheels began to come off in February 1986, when Kaiser
Matanzima term of office as President of Transkei expired, leaving
effective power in the hands of the Prime Minister, his brother
George. The notorious corruption of both Matanzima brothers has
been extensively documented, but, whereas Kaiser had maintained a
modicum of discretion, George threw all caution to the winds. On
one occasion, for instance, he took delivery of R500,000 in a
cardbox box in exchange for a housing contract. In another, more
celebrated case he demanded and received R2 million from Sol
Kerzner's Sun International in exchange for sole gambling rights in
I
 Work in Progress (Johannesburg) 14, (1980).
II
 B. Streek and R. Wicksteed, Render unto Kaiser
(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1981).
Transkei.12 Some time in 1985 Jiyana Maqubela, the Auditor-
General, slipped a motivation for a Commission of Inquiry into a
pile of routine papers which George Matanzima unthinkingly signed.
The first Commission of Inquiry, into the Department of Commerce,
Industry and Tourism, began to hear evidence in February 1986. It
was a slow-burning fuse, but it led inexorably first to George, and
then to Kaiser himself.
The Matanzima brothers were also undermined by the emergence
of discontent in the military. The Transkei Defence Force (TDF) had
ca created in 1975, and was black officered though South African
trained. In 1981, however, Kaiser dismissed the three senior
Transkeian officers, and hired a group of ex-Rhodesian Selous
Scouts to run his army. The Selous Scouts provided Kaiser with
security, but they were disliked by their black subordinates.
Matters did not improve when Zondwa Mtirara was appointed Commander
of the TDF in February 1986. He was the son of the usurping Chief
Bambilanga Mtirara, who had taken over the Therobu Paramount
Chieftaincy after Kaiser had driven Paramount Chief Sabata
Dalindyebo into exile in 1983. The sharpest critic of the Selous
Scouts within the TDF was its second-in-command. Brigadier Bantu
Holomisa, who was detained on 21 January 1987 for complaining that
12
The best short overview of these events is F.Kruger, "How
Greed Toppled the Matanzima Dynasty," Weekly Mail, 25 Sept.1987.
the Selous Scouts used TDF facilities for their private security
operations.
With George Matanzima's concurrence, the TDF had also embarked
on a foreign adventure." Ciskei, the other Xhosa-speaking
homeland, had long been a target of the Matanzimas. In September
1986, white mercenaries associated with the TDF staged a daring
double coup, freeing Charles Sebe (the brother and rival of Ciskei
President L.L. Sebe) from a maximum security prison, while
simultaneously kidnapping Kwane Sebe (the President's only son).
This triumph was followed by a full-scale military assault on the
Ciskei Presidential Palace in February 1987. The attack was a
failure, and one TDF soldier was killed. The Transkeian officers
were furious, partly because they disapproved of the entire
project, but mostly because George Matanzima attempted to evade his
own responsibility by placing the blame on them.
George Matanzima*s biggest problem, however, was his brother
Kaiser. Barely six months after relinquishing the Presidency,
Kaiser attempted a political comeback by nominating his own slate
13 Daily Dispatch, 16 April 1987.
*' The full details concerning this episode have been hushed
up, and it is still not fully understood. For the events, see
Daily Dispatch 30 Sept, 8 Oct-1986; Eastern Province Herald 20
Feb.1987.
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Congress of the ruling party chose Stella Sigcau as the new Prime
Minister.16
Stella Sigcau, the daughter of deceased State President Botha
Sigcau, had been in and out of Kaiser's cabinets since before
Transkei "independence." There was nothing in her record to suggest
that her political principles differed from those of her former
colleagues. Yet once in office she proceeded to take a number of
stands that deeply disturbed not only Kaiser Matanzima, but the
" uth African government as well. She made statements to the effect
at the "independence" of Transkei was not irreversible. When she
went overseas, she declined to read the speech that had been
thoughtfully provided for her by the South African Department of
Foreign Affairs. Her younger brother, Chief Ntsikayezwe Sigcau,
travelled to Lusaka and met with the ANC.
But her most fatal decision was to detain Kaiser Matanzima,
who had started to bombard the press and the security police with
calls for the overthrow of the "Communistic" Transkei government.
Matanzima was soon released from detention "for health reasons,"
and went to Bloemf ontein to recuperate. It is said that he planned
the next coup from his hospital bed, with the assistance of high
South African officials. On 30 December 1987, the TDF declared
16
 Weekly Mail, 8 May, 25 Sept. 1987; Daily Dispatch, 9,16 May,
25 Sept, 6 Oct.1987.
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of candidates for the September 1986 Transkei elections.15 The
electorate, preferring the easier master, chose George. Early in
1987, Kaiser and his supporters walked out of the Congress of the
Transkei National Independence Party, and announced that they
intended to take over the Government. Kaiser still had many
friends in the discontented military, among them Craig Duli, the
head of Transkei military intelligence. It was Duli who organised
Transkei's first military coup (3 April 1987) . The Selous Scouts
were deported from Transkei, and their pet, Zondwa Mtirara, was
removed. Bantu Holomisa, who was released from detention, was
appointed commander of the TDF in his place.
Kaiser formed a new political party and announced his
intention of taking over the government. George's image had been
badly tarnished by the ongoing revelations of the Commission of
Inquiry', and he was under considerable pressure to resign. But he
refused to do so, and his supporters passed a constitutional
amendment barring Kaiser from sitting in the Transkei Parliament.
On 24 September 1987, the army struck again and forced the
resignation of George Matanzima and 8 of his ministers. With Kaiser
out of the running due to the constitutional amendment, the
15
 Daily Dispatch. 22,24 Sept, 20 Oct.1986; 19 May, 23 Sept
1987.
martial law and took over the Transkei government. Stella was out
after only 86 days in office on the pretext that she had accepted
a R50,000 bribe from George Matanzima.17
The roost obvious beneficiary of the coup was Kaiser Matanzima.
Although still officially banished, he presented himself before
cheering crowds in Umtata on the day that the new Military Council
was announced. Shortly thereafter, the banning order was rescinded.
The new Transkei cabinet was packed with his supporters, and the
following month it was announced that the hated Commission of
a^uiry was to be wound up. The South African Security Police had
a field day in Transkei, and intervened directly to clean up the
Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) cadres who had infiltrated Transkei. Three
suspected MK were gunned down in Umtata in broad daylight, two more
were killed in Mount Fletcher, and a sixth was detained and shot in
Butterworth. Bantu Holomisa, the new military head of state, was
widely regarded as nothing more than a catspaw of the Matanzimas.18
Holomisa Takes Charge
But Kaiser had made a serious mistake. Holomisa had long been
sympathetic to the liberation movements, and he gradually edged out
of the Matanzima shadow. The catalyst for the break was the Thembu
Daily Dispatch, 1 December 1987, and personal sources.
18
 Daily Dispatch 7,23 Jan.1988; 3 Feb.1988; Weekly Mail, 3,19
Feb. 1988,
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succession dispute, a "tribal" matter in which the South African
government was unable to interfere.
Umtata, the capital of Transkei, is situated in Thembuland.
Kaiser Matanzima is a Thembu chief, but so is Nelson Mandela. Bantu
Holomisa is also a Thembu chief, albeit of a tributary clan. The
late Paramount Chief, Sabata Dalindyebo, had been driven into exile
in 1983 on account of his support of the ANC. Kaiser had installed
Bambilanga Mtirara, Sabata's compliant brother as Paramount in his
place. When Bambilanga died late in 1987, the succession was
claimed by Buyelekhaya, Sabata's exiled son, and by Zondwa Mtirara,
Bambilanga's son and Holomisa's old rival in the TDF. Kaiser, who
hated Sabata's family, engineered the nomination of Zondwa as
Paramount Chief. Holomisa, however, blocked Zondwa * s formal
installation and insisted that the dispute be referred to the
Dalindyebo Regional Authority. When Kaiser protested that the
government should not interfere in a tribal matter, Holomisa
responded most cuttingly that Kaiser himself had initiated
government interference in tribal matters by deposing Chief Sabata
in the first place.19
It was war. Matanzima initiated two lengthy but unsuccessful
legal actions, one to recognise Zondwa as Paramount Chief of
Thembuland, and one to declare the Military Government illegal.
19
 Daily Dispatch 16,22 June 1988; 14 April 1989; 1 May 1989
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He also attempted to embarass Holomisa by exposing a rumoured
adulterous love affair to the press. Holomisa reacted by dropping
Craig Duli and two pro-Kaiser Cabinet Ministers from the Transkei
government (April 1989).30
Although Holomisa had already established some contacts with
the ANC leadership, he still remained the head of an unpopular
homeland government, and by this time the United Democratic Front
had belatedly made its appearance in Transkei. Again, the Ihembu
ramountcy issue served as a catalyst. The funeral of the late
.-aramount Chief Sabata had been conducted by Kaiser Hatanzima, and
it was suspected by Sabata's family that Kaiser had tampered with
the body. At the initiative of Sabatafs councillors, all ANC
supporters, the decision was taken to exhume Sabata*s coffin and
21give it an appropriate reburial. The reburial, in October 1989,
was attended by tens of thousands of people. The ANC flag was
openly displayed in Transkei for the first time in thirty years,
together with the revolutionary songs and dances already familiar
elsewhere in South Africa. Holomisa, still seen by many as a
homeland puppet, was not well received by the crowd and was clearly
very embarassed. "We took over, we did not consult," he admitted,
and he ended his short speech by suggesting that the government
20
 Daily Dispatch 10,28 April 1989; 3,31 May 1989.
1
 Daily Dispatch, 19 May 1989. The most salient features of
the reburial were not reported in the local press, but videos of it
circulated in Umtata.
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might hold a referendum on Transkei "independence.*1 After Holomisa
had finished speaking, the visiting ANC leaders scolded the crowd
for their negative attitude towards Holomisa, and exhorted them to
give the General their support. The alignment between Holomisa and
the democratic movement, although still implicit rather than
explicit, was finally in place.
The last quarter of 1989 was a tempestuous one for Transkei.
Major strikes erupted in Umtata and Butterworth, and schools
throughout the homeland were boycotted and burned. Against this
increasingly stormy background, Holomisa's military government took
a series of decisions that sharply contradicted South African
government policy. Within a week of Sabata * s reburial, the
government released six MK cadres serving long prison sentences.
Two more cadres facing execution were reprieved by a moratorium on
capital punishment. And the Transkei government took the
opportunity of the annual "independence" celebrations to declare
their intention of unbanning the African National Congress and the
Pan-African Congress. Walter Sisulu and other released ANC leaders
praised Holomisa, and called on other homeland leaders to follow
his example. The Transkei government continued to pursue corruption
charges against Sun International, and to fight claims for Rll
million demanded by JALC, a construction company with ties to the
22
South African security establishment. *
22
 Daily Dispatch 7, 27 Oct 1989; 27 Nov.1989; 15 Jan.1990
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Meanwhile, the conservative forces had regrouped and were
planning to recover control of Transkei by force. They were led by
Kaiser Matanzima and Chris Van Rensburg (a director of JALC), and
included Craig Duli, Vuli Mbotoli (the head of JALC in Transkei)
and various displaced civil servants. The group organised two
unsuccessful attempts to assassinate Holomisa during the course of
1989. They also addressed a memorandum to Andries Venter, the
senior civil servant responsible for the "independent1* homelands,
calling for military intervention to topple Holomisa.
The South African government was not yet ready for military
intervention, but it too had decided that Holomisa must go.
Obviously, it was not possible to utter this thought openly. The
demand for Holomisa's resignation was therefore encoded in the
phrase "return to civilian rule," which they began to circulate in
Transkei during the second half of 1989. At about the same time.
South Africa started to flex its economic muscle. An important part
of Transkei*s revenue comes from quarterly payments of just over
R200 million each, which are deemed to be Transkei's share of the
Southern Africa Customs Union. In August 1989. South Africa
threatened to stop these payments unless Transkei withdrew its ban
on South African sorghum beer. This ban, which was intended to
protect local manufacturers, was first imposed by Kaiser Matanzima
23
 Daily Dispatch 1 Aug.1989; 15 Jan.1990; New Nation 9, 16
August 1991.
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in 1985.2* South Africa did not protest then. Nor did it protest
to the obedient governments of Ciskei and Bophuthatswana, who also
maintained similar bans. But as Transkei was slipping out of
Pretoria's control, the South African government considered
manipulating these payments in order to rein Holomisa in.
South African President F.W. De Klerk and Foreign Minister Pik
Botha visited Umtata on 11 January 1990. It was only three weeks
before De Klerk's landmark speech of 2 February unbanning the
liberation movements and promising a new South Africa. But De
Klerk's attitude to Holomisa was anything but new. He "advised"
Transkei to move towards civilian rule (at the very same time that
South Africa was planning its own military coups against civilian
governments in Ciskei and Vendal). He told Holomisa that,
irrespective of the results of the proposed referendum, Transkei
could not unilaterally reintegrate into South Africa. He raised the
question of sorghum beer. Pik Botha went even further. He took
Holomisa aside during the lunch break, and asked him to drop
bribery charges against Sol Kerzner and Sun International.
When Holomisa stood his ground, South Africa threatened to delay
the Customs Union payments over the sorghum beer issue. It also
refused to ratify salary adjustments for civil servants which
U
 Daily Dispatch 9,10 March, 29 Aug 1989, 17 Jan 1990.
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 Daily Dispatch 12,16 January 1990; 19 March 1990. Pik Botha
had already, on previous occasions, tried to persuade Holomisa to
pay JALC the Rll million it was claiming from Transkei.
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Holomisa had announced in December 1989, thus forcing the Transkei
government to borrow the money from the state pension fund. The
Department of Foreign Affairs leaked confidential information to
the newspapers with a view to creating the impression that the
Transkei government was financially irresponsible."
Relationships between Holomisa and the South African
government continued to deteriorate. In June 1990, Pik Botha
informed the South African Parliament that he was considering
withholding one million Rand that had been budgeted for Transkei.
Things got even worse after August 1990, when Holomisa met Pik
Botha and Inkatha leader Gatsha Buthelezi to discuss the violence
on the Rand in which hundreds of Transkeians had been killed.
Holomisa had requested the meeting, but he found on his arrival
that the Department of Foreign Affairs had already prepared a
meaningless "joint statement," which he was expected to endorse
without any prior discussion. He therefore released his own
memorandum, in which he blamed the violence on Inkatha and the
South African Police and threatened to send Transkeian troops into
the Republic to defend their people."
But even this threat did not alarm South Africa half as much
as the threat implied by the presence in Transkei of Chris Hani,
26
 Daily Dispatch 16, 17 Jan. 23,24,28 March 1990
37
 Daily Dispatch 6 June 1990; 22, 23 Aug.1990.
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the Chief of Staff of Umkhonto weSizwe. For this presence. South
Africa had only itself to blame. It had unexpectedly revoked Hani's
indemnity from prosecution in South Africa, and Hani, an ethnic
Transkeian, had taken advantage of Transkei's "independence" to
take refuge in Umtata (July-August 1990) . Hani was well received in
Transkei, and a number of government facilities were placed at his
disposal. At the same time, many indemnified MK cadres of Transkei
origin were returning to their homes. Rumours began to circulate in
South Africa (though not in Transkei) that Chris Hani was
integrating MK into the TDF, that the TDF was sending its soldiers
"i be trained in Cuba, that Cuban soldiers had arrived in
iranskei. There were also claims of Libyan and Nigerian
involvement. It is probable that most of these rumours were
deliberate disinformation, but the South African security
establishment clearly began to apprehend that the turn of events in
28Transkei posed a concrete military threat to South Africa.
28
 Daily Dispatch 6,7,27 Nov 1990, 22 Sept 1991; Sunday Times
(Johannesburg) 26 Aug. 1990; New Nation 16 Aug.1991. The British
newsletter, Africa Confidential, has also been a target of this
disinformation, and has published a number of misleading reports
about Transkei, particularly the lead story on 22 Feb 1991 entitled
"Inside Hani-land." Much of this is fantasy, for example with
regard to the alleged TUWO aunties "who used to ululate in praise
of K.D. [Matanzima] .. now perform the same service for Hani."
Apart from the fact that there are no longer any TUWO aunties, it
is not true that Matanzima's supporters have switched to Hani or
the ANC. Even more serious, three out six people named as Communist
supporters of Chris Hani on the ANC Regional Executive were not
members of the Regional Executive, and two out of the other three
were not Communists.
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The Duli Coup
This increased nervousness about Transkei presumably led South
Africa to lend a more sympathetic ear to the proposals from the
JALC/Matanzima "Transkei Group," which they had rejected the
previous year. With the adherence of Craig Duli, they had acquired
their own independent military capability, and they began planning
a coup in real earnest. Transkei repeatedly requested South Africa
to extradite Vuli Mbotoli (of JALC) who had been implicated in the
1989 attempts to assassinate Holomisa. In April 1990, Duli, Mbotoli
and Boetie Davis (a former Matanzima bodyguard) were arrested for
illegal possession of arms, including assault rifles, mortars,
mortar bombs and hand grenades. These arms were formerly the
property of the defunct Lesotho Liberation Army, which South Africa
had sponsored to fight against Chief Leabua Jonathan. Although the
South African state is usually quite paranoid about unauthorised
African possession of heavy weaponry, it proved remarkably tolerant
in this case and released the three on bail. Xn November 1990, Duli
and his associates moved into a luxury hotel on the East London
beachfront as, in their own words, "guests of the South African
government." They were constantly visited there by white men who
have still not been identified. On 19 November 1990, just three
days before Duli's attempted coup, Transkei lodged an official
complaint about his activities with the South African government.
The Department of Foreign Affairs responded that South Africa would
19
not allow acts of aggression on neighbouring countries to be
launched from its territory."
Two days after this pious declaration, Duli and a small group
of about 30 insurgents entered Transkei from South Africa. They
arrived at Ncise army base just outside Umtata at about 3 am, and
asked the soldiers there to join them. The officers equivocated,
but the rank and file refused and were fired on. Duli then occupied
the top floor of the Botha Sigcau building, a giant office block in
the centre of Umtata which is the headquarters of the civil
service. He was clearly expecting outside assistance, but Holomisa
was equal to the challenge. The first thing Holomisa did was to
offer the South African Embassy in Umtata TDF troops for its
"protection". This must have been the last thing the Embassy
wanted, and they told Holomisa that protection was unnecessary.
Holomisa then went on the radio and used the Embassy statement as
proof of his contention that the situation was under control. He
emphasised that the Transkei government had not requested any help
from anybody, and that any troops who crossed the border "whatever
their colour" would be fired on. The warning roust have been heeded,
because nobody came to Duli's aid, and he was left to die in the
ensuing Shootout.
29
 Daily Dispatch 23,24,30 Nov.1990.
This account is based on Daily Dispatch reports, 23-8 Nov
1990, and on personal observation in Umtata.
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F.W. De Klerk and Pik Botha failed to apologise to Transkei
for allowing their territory to be used as a springboard for an
attack, just two days after they had promised otherwise. Indeed, De
Klerk was so indignant at Holomisa's charges of South African
collusion that he threatened to sever all financial and diplomatic
ties unless the General kept quiet. Despite De Klerk's denial of
South African involvement, it has been established that members of
the security forces visited Duli's East London hotel after the
coup, and removed all documents relating to their late guests. Nor
did the South African government facilitate the extradition of Duli
conspirator Vuli Mbotoli from South Africa. Mbotoli was the central
figure in a second plotted coup attempt, scheduled for 25 April
1991, which failed to get off the ground when Holomisa's men
kidnapped him on South African soil shortly before the deadline.31
There can be no doubt that some elements of the South African
security machine was implicated in the attempted coup. They not
only refused to heed Transkeifs repeated appeals with regard to
Duli and Mbotoli, but they actually abetted the coup plotters
during their stay in East London, and covered their tracks after
they were dead.32 But it is still not at clear at which level of
31
 New Nation 16 August 1991.
This only came to light due to the determined reportage of
Daily Dispatch reporters Patrick and Stan Goodenough. This is
perhaps the best place to congratulate the Dispatch (one of only
two mainstream South African newspapers not controlled by the Argus
conglomerate) for its excellent coverage of events in the Transkei
and Ciskei.
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government the plot was approved. The most obvious direct link
between the South African authorities and the coup plotters is JALC
director Chris Van Rensburg, who sponsored Duli and Mbotoli and
whom Duli telephoned from the Botha Sigcau building at the time of
the coup. Van Rensburg was a long-time business associate of Kaiser
Matanzima, and has suffered heavy personal financial losses due to
Holomisa's refusal to pay JALC the Rll million it claims on account
of a housing contract.
It would seem, however, that there is more to Van Rensburg's
involvement than a mere financial grudge. Van Rensburg was
associated with the old Department of Information in the days
before the Muldergate scandal (1978) , and it seems that he has
continued to operate on the fringes of government. JALC has
publicly hinted at its association with South African Military
Intelligence, and Craig Duli was the head of its Transkeian
equivalent. This close linkage between private business and the
security establishment was a central feature of P.W. Botha's
National Security Management System, which was operational right up
to the moment that F.W. De Klerk took over, and whose present role
is obscure. The 1991 plan to assassinate Holomisa was initiated by
"International Research," Military Intelligence's Ciskei operation,
which will be fully discussed in the next section. On the other
hand, the South African Security Police (which falls under the
Police, not the Army) seems to have opposed at least some of these
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adventures. Most people in Transkei believe that the coup was
initiated and executed at the local level (the "Transkei group")
but that it could not have gone ahead without consent from the very-
top.
A notable aspect of the attempted coup was the spontaneous
outpouring of popular support for the Holomisa government.
Literally thousands of elite civilians thronged the streets of
Umtata, demanding arms to fight Craig Duli and the anticipated
invasion from South Africa. It is believed that Duli had organised
a widespread network of highly-placed individuals, who were
cognisant of the plot but lost their nerve when confronted with the
sheer extent of Holomisa's support among all classes of the
Transkeian population. The attitude of the middle classes might be
surprising to some, given the predictions concerning their
reactionary tendencies provided by analysts such as Southall and
Jozana. But Holomisa had never interfered with the privileges of
these classes. Indeed, on the question of civil service salaries,
he had done as much as Kaiser Matanzima ever did. Holomisa's
government also took the part of the Transkeian employers when
their interests were threatened by the Workers Co-ordinating
Council in March-April 1990, going so far as to send troops into
33
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34 See the concluding section for a detailed discussion
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Butterworth. Chris Hani had also been active in reassuring black
businessmen, and telling workers and students that these should not
be regarded as capitalists. Whatever nostalgia some businessmen
might have felt for the good old days of the Matanzimas, their
interests had not yet been sufficiently threatened to make them
risk their lives in a military confrontation.
The failure of the Duli coup increased the feeling in
Nationalist Party circles that the homelands should be done away
with as soon as possible. Take, for example, the following
editorial in the Beeld newspaper:3'
For South Africa, there is one big lesson to be learnt
from the abortive coup against General Holomisa's
questionable regime: as a solution to South Africa's
constitutional problem, independent ethnic homelands are,
and always were, a lamentable failure ...
In a new set up, what is now known as the independent
republic of Transkei will, at most, be a regional
authority on a geographical basis, with restricted
powers. The sooner that happens, the better.
This feeling was compounded by an even greater, though quite
different, reverse in the neighbouring homeland of Ciskei.
35
 This is an important issue, but it cannot be addressed here
See, for example, Daily Dispatch 7,26 March, 10 April, 8 May 1990
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37 Quoted in Daily Dispatch 3 Dec. 1990.
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II; CISKEI - FROM SEBE TO GQOZO
Like Transkei, Ciskei is a Xhosa-speaking area. But there all
similarity ends. Ciskei, with a resident population of just under
one million, is much smaller than Transkei but much more densely-
settled. Whereas Transkei is largely rural with a traditionalist
peasant population subject to powerful chiefs, Ciskei is heavily
urbanised and industrialised with a largely proletarianised
population which scarcely respects chiefs and traditions. Whereas
Transkei is relatively isolated and se-lf-contained, Ciskei is
;tle more than the black hinterland of Queens town. Ring William's
/wn and East London. Whereas Transkei entered the national
political mainstream slowly and belatedly, Ciskei was from the very
first a stronghold of the trade unions and civic. In 1991, the
Border region of the ANC, which includes Ciskei, had more paid-up
members of the organisation than any other region outside the
Transvaal.
The dominant figure in Ciskei homeland politics from 1973 to
1990 was Lennox L. Sebe. Throughout his political career, Sebe
battled to fabricate a distinctively Ciskeian national identity
which could compete with the broader African nationalism of the ANC
and the pan-Xhosa tribalism of Matanzima's Transkei. To this end.
3fl
For an overview of the recent history of Ciskei, see
Anonymous [J.B. peires] "Ethnicity and Pseudo-Ethnicity in Ciskei,"
in The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa ed, Leroy Vail.
(London: James Currey, 1989).
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he initiated a number of costly prestige projects - such as the
"national shrine" at Ntaba kaNdoda and the "international airport"
at Bisho - all of which ended in ridicule and failure. Unlike
Kaiser Matanzima, Sebe possessed a stolid and avuncular
personality, and was easily influenced by others, more especially
by whites. It is also rumoured that he required an unusual degree
of medication, which might explain why the Ciskeian Minister of
Health was always white.-" A weak man in a tough job, Sebe always
depended on one strong man or another to help him cope. He was,
however, somewhat more wary than he seemed to be, and as soon as
the strong man of the moment overplayed his hand, Sebe dumped him
and found somebody else. The most celebrated instance of this was
the case of Charles Sebe, the President's younger brother, who
ruled Ciskei through the dreaded Ciskei Intelligence Service until
Lennox got rid of him in 1984.
The South African government found Sebe a pliable but
expensive tool. His appetite for prestige projects and for personal
enrichment made him an easy mark for foreign confidence tricksters,
and he infuriated his financial minders in December 1988 when he
insisted on a 40% across the board payrise for the Ciskei cabinet
and a whopping R185,000 per annum for himself. Even more alarming
39
 See also Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 20 Nov.1988.
" Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 4 December 1988. Sebe had
dubious friends in Austria (aeronautics), Israel (pharmaceutics),
France (toxic waste) and Italy (drugs - the notorious Vito
Palazzolo).
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was the rise to influence of Sebe's only son, Kwane Sebe, on whom
his father increasingly depended. Kwane was groomed for succession
by his fond parent, and was placed in command of a new Police
Elite Unit. Unfortunately, he was the kind of man who made enemies
easily, and made use of his state powers to gratify his instinct
for revenge. Colonel 2. Mgwanya, for instance, was once a close
friend of Kwane's. But when he revealed Kwanefs personal role in
the Elite Unit murder of a trade unionist, Kwane ordered the Unit
to bomb Ngwanya's liquor store."
It goes without saying that the Sebe government was completely
unable to check the rising power of the trade unions and the civic
associations. But the truth is that Sebe was more concerned by the
attempted military coup in Bophutatswana in February 1988. (This
was the only attempted coup in homeland history that was not
sponsored by the South African authorities, and the South African
Defence Force suppressed it very quickly.) Sebe became obssessed
with the idea that his generals were plotting against him, and he
kept on calling meetings with them and begging them not to
overthrow him. Ultimately, Sebe hit on the ludicrous idea of
staging a coup against himself so as to install Kwane as
President. *
11
 Daily Dispatch 23 Aug.1990.
*
2
 This paragraph is derived from a highly-placed source within
the Ciskei government. A slightly different version of the same
story appeared in the Weekly Mail 9 March 1990.
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This childish behaviour could not have come at a worse time
for Sebe. Inspired by the heroic defiance of the Ciskei government
by the village of Nkqonkqweni, a wave of popular resistance
erupted throughout the homeland, symbolised by the mass rejection
of Ciskei National Independence Party membership cards. The
situation became even more inflamed after the release of Nelson
Mandela, when Ciskei police fired at random into the celebrating
crowds of Mdantsane, killing at least ten people. On 2 March 1990,
Sebe left for Hong Kong on a "business trip" organised by the South
African government, and two days later Brigadier Oupa Gqozo
proclaimed a military government.*3
Gqozo was born in the Orange Free State, and was a prison
warder before joining the South African Defence Force. After that
he was "military attache" to the Ciskei Embassy in Pretoria, and he
only returned to Ciskei three weeks before the coup. Nobody in
Ciskei had ever heard of him before he took over the government.
The warning signs were there for all to see, but the people were so
pleased to get rid of Sebe that they were happy to give the new man
a chance. And indeed, Gqozo did start off on a very positive note.
He adopted a democratic style and shared platforms with Mandela and
the ANC, promising to meet the people and redress their grievances.
He abolished the death penalty and reformed the labour laws. He
arrested Kwane Sebe and set up a Commission of Inquiry to deal with
43
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the corruption of the Sebe government. And even though he did crack
down very heavily on a hospital strike, he was still sufficiently
well-regarded by the workers to settle the bitter labour disputes
which had broken out in the Dimbaza industrial area.**
But it soon became apparent that there was a darker side to
Gqozo. This first manifested itself in his decision to drop the
other members of the Military Council, leaving only himself and the
aptly-named Silence Pita. In July 1990, he appointed the convicted
drug-dealer Vito Palazzolo as Ciskei's Ambassador Plenipotentiary.
The Ciskei's new constitution included a compulsory five year
prison sentence for insulting the dignity of the head of state.
Most extraordinarily, Gqozo's government refused to meet with the
Mdantsane Residents Association on the grounds that it had no
mandate from the people. In November 1990, Gqozo infuriated the
people of Ciskei by apologising to KwaZulu over an incident at
Uobane Colliery in which 11 miners (all Xhosa-speaking) were
billed. It was also widely rumoured that Gqozo had given a multi-
million Rand cheque to KwaZulu as compensation. This was the first
sign of the warm relationship between Gqozo and Inkatha leader
Gatsha Buthelezi.
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Paradoxically, the more Gqozo antagonised the Ciskeian people,
the more confident he became. This confidence can be attributed to
the arrival in Bisho (the Ciskei capital) of a security unit
calling itself "International Research." The chief researcher was
Anton Niewoudt, Gqozof s former lieutenant in the South African
Defence Force and connected with Military Intelligence- Niewoudt
had directed operations at Camp Hippo in Northern Namibia, where
the South African Defence Force had trained Inkatha fighters.
Niewoudt and two of his fellow researchers drew salaries of
R120,000+ a year. The remainder of the research team consisted of
?rmer members of Koevoet (the notorious anti-SWAPO unit from
Hamibia) and 32 battalion (a unit of non-South African blacks
recruited to fight in Namibia.)"
In January 1991, Gqozo and International Research lured
Charles Sebe and M. Guzana (a member of Gqozo's original Military
Council) into Ciskei, and butchered them in cold blood. Both men
were unarmed, and both sustained more than ten bullet wounds.
Gqozo even stated publicly that he had given orders that Charles
Sebe should be shot on sight and not taken prisoner. It is true
that Charles had made himself very much hated in Ciskei, but the
brutal and gratuitous nature of his murder shocked even his former
enemies. Gqozo claimed that Charles had been conspiring with the
ANC to stage a coup, and he is also reported to have said that
Chris Hani would also be shot dead if he set foot in Ciskei. It is
46
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rumoured that Charles was killed to give International Research a
pretext for cracking down on the ANC in Ciskei.*7
Shortly after this, however, Gqozo found that he had a genuine
crisis on his hands. The professional soldiers in the Ciskei
Defence Force were very unhappy at the way in which they had been
subordinated to International Research. They wrote a letter to
Gqozo demanding his resignation, citing among other things, his
dictatorial style, his unnecessary antagonisation of popular
organisations and his alleged "blank cheque" to the KwaZulu
government• Headed by the Commander of the CDF, Brigadier M.
Jamangile, the senior officers went to the house in Bisho which
International Research used as their armoury, and made arrangements
to transfer the weapons to a CDF military base. They were
interrupted by a squad from International Research, who opened fire
and detained them all. Jamangile and the others were accused of
conducting a coup, but one of the officers escaped and told the
whole story to the Daily Dispatch. The Ciskei government has
implicitly admitted the truth of the officers1 version by dropping
treason charges and releasing the affected officers, rather than
10
allow the case to come to court."
17
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 Gqozo was forced to back down on his claims, due to the
public outrage over Charles Sebe's death. Daily Dispatch 29
Jan.l991;5 Feb.l991;5 June 1991.
48
 Daily Dispatch 22,23 Feb. 1991; 7 March 1991.
31
These revelations finally shattered whatever was left of
Gqozo's credibility. Whereas Sebe had had, at least, some
supporters and some legitimacy, Gqozo had none. He was completely
unmasked as a stooge, entirely dependent on Military Intelligence.
Nobody was more aware of this than the South African government. It
had sent Gqozo to Ciskei during F.W. De Klerk's brief honeymoon
with the ANC, in the hope that he would restore stability and
control. The brutal and erratic behaviour of Gqozo and the
International Research cowboys had only succeeded in alienating the
people still further and had destroyed any hope of co-opting them
into the system.
Gqozo's appalling mismanagement seems to have crystallised the
shift in government opinion on the homelands that had been evident
in the aftermath of the Dull coup. Two days after the shooting
incident, Pik Botha flew to Ciskei and announced that South Africa
would help to "restructure" Ciskei's government. Later the same
month (26 Feb.1991), South Africa took over direct control of the
most important ministerial portfolios, including justice, finance
and state administration) , and declared that it would assist in the
maintenance of law and order. The Ciskei constitution was changed
to make legal provision for Ciskei to relinquish its sovereignty.
Gqozo declared that the agreement was the first step on the road of
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reincorporating the Ciskei into South Africa. Needless to say, the
people of Ciskei were not in any way consulted."
Ever since then, Pretoria has ruled Ciskei with an iron hand.
International Research dressed up as the Ciskei Police keeps order
with teargas and birdshot. The Ciskeian Commissioner of Police has
been replaced by a white policeman from the Transvaal. A new system
of local government is being imposed by vigilante groups despite
vehement protests from the people. Hundreds of activists were
detained during a temporary State of Emergency in November 1991.
Over 3,000 striking state employees have been fired. Four prominent
ANC leaders have been put on a hit list. Radio Ciskei has been
purged of its politically-minded staff, and the survivors are
forbidden to mention the names of ANC, PAC or AZAPO. The radio has
promised to become "highly musical.""
It is not clear how much longer Brigadier Gqozo will still be
around to enjoy the music. Pretoria's first thought was to make his
job "more ceremonial," and Gqozo kept a very low profile for a good
few months. Lately he has re-emerged, with the intention of
starting an Inkatha-style political movement in Ciskei. He was
*
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going to call it the Ciskei Freedom Party, but the name has been
tactfully altered to African Democratic Movement.*1
It is unwise to predict the future, but it is difficult to see
the present status quo in Ciskei as anything more than a holding
operation. The homeland has already been de facto reincorporated
into South Africa under the 26 February agreement. Transkei and
Venda have been asked to sign similar agreements, which South
African government officials explicitly label "an interim step
ending a decision on how to reincorporate all the homelands into
South Africa."52
3. The Weakness at the Centre
Every serious analyst of the homeland system since Harold
Wolpe in 1972 shares the view that the primary function of the
homelands within the political economy of South Africa has changed
from one of "being primarily the reproducer of cheap labour .. to
the fundamental institutions for the containment and control of the
country's absolute surplus of population of Africans."53
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Once homeland governments lost their control capability, as
they did in the Ciskei and Transkei cases, they became redundant
and even dangerous to the security of the South African state. The
public decision of the South African government to abandon the
homeland system is the result of its desire to reassert lost
control, rather than a manifestation of its commitment to reform.
In this concluding section, I am going to try and generalise beyond
the specific events which led to the implosion of Transkei and
Ciskei, and to point up the essential weakness at the centre of the
homeland system.
The Ciskei homeland never achieved even the first prerequisite
of government control, namely legitimacy. To a far greater extent
than any other homeland, Ciskei lacked an ethnic constituency, and
all President Sebe's pseudo-ethnic gyrations could not create the
semblance of a Ciskeian nation. The Ciskei government was equally
deficient in any class support base, since the close proximity of
Ring William's Town and East London produced not only a strong and
unionised industrial working-classs, but a robust and independent
black bourgeoisie which was not reliant on the Ciskei government
for housing, employment, trading licenses or other economic
necessities. The political alliance of the black middle and
working-classes, expressed in the civic associations, threatened to
Commonwealth Studies Collected Seminar Papers on the Societies of
Southern Africa. 3 (1973); D.Innes and D.O'Meara, "Class formation
and ideology: the Transkei region," Review of African Political
Economy. 7 (1976)-
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overwhelm Sebe's feeble administration, thereby prompting South
Africa to replace him with the more energetic and apparently
competent Oupa Gqozo. But Gqozo was not even a born Ciskeian, and
he lacked even the grudging legitimacy that Sebe had accumulated
over 17 years of personal rule. Once Gqozo's links with Military
Intelligence had been exposed by the Jamangile incident, the
question of control in Ciskei boiled down to the balance of brute
force, where it still remains today [December 1991].
The events in Transkei are that much more analytically
fruitful than those in Ciskei inasmuch as conditions in Transkei
were that much more conducive to the homeland strategy. The
relatively tiny Transkeian middle class depended on the homeland
government for salaries, promotion, housing, licenses and other
privileges. Roger Southall, who has subjected this class to a
minute scrutiny, has dubbed them the "beneficiaries of Transkeian
independence."" Innes and O*Meara speak of "elements of the petty
bourgeoisie which seek to transform themselves into a bourgeoisie
R. Southall, "The beneficiaries of Transkei Independence,"
Journal of Modern African Studies XV (1977).
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through collaboration with the Apartheid state."55 Jozana asserts
that:55
The Bantustan leaders, often seen as puppets by the
liberation forces, have secured support-bases from
various social groups that have emerged within white-
created institutions. These groups have something to show
for their gains: wealth, position, status and authority.
To them, it is inconsequential that the status they enjoy
is confined to their own circles. They will resist all
attempts by the liberation movements to change the status
quo.
Though Southall is more guarded ("the mere creation of a black
middle class does not in itself guarantee that such an element will
be non-revolutionary,") he concedes that:
The extreme degree of economic dependence of Transkei
upon the South African government will continue to ensure
that the core of the petty-bourgeoisie will be tied to
the white regime - and such a course is likely to promote
a widening polarization between the collaborationists and
the Transkeian mass.
The behaviour of the middle classes during the crisis of the
Duli coup shows that they do not conform to the expectations of
these analysts. Despite all appearances to the contrary, the
putative homeland alliance between the South African state and the
collaborationist bourgeoisie was just as devoid of existence in
" Innes and O'Meara, "Class Formation," p.80. Innes and
O'Meara do emphasise that "only a small proportion of the petty
bourgeois agents in the region" can be accomodated in the alliance
with the South African state. Their prediction that a "very small
class" of capitalist farmers" would eventually emerge as a
significant element in Transkei has not been borne out by
subsequent events.
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Transkei as it had been in Ciskei. In part, this can be explained
by the historically ambiguous position of the black bourgeoisie,5"
and in part it can be explained by the subjective perceptions of
the black bourgeoisie themselves. Even though the Transkei
bourgeoisie might privately admit that they have benefitted from
the system, they do not regard themselves as sell-outs nor are they
satisfied with what they see as the crumbs which have fallen from
the white man's table. They see their capital as Pretoria not
/cata, and they share a common interest with the black middle
classes elsewhere in the country who would prefer a black South
African government to the present white one.
More significantly, however, the failure of the Transkeian
middle classes to support the Matanzimaist faction points to a
vital disjuncture between the homeland state and the homeland
bourgeoisie which has gone a.fl»pl«li_lj unnoticed in the literature,
and which surely requires a complete re-evaluation of homeland
political structures. Radical analysis has never, in fact,
attempted to define the relationship between the homeland
leadership and the local bourgeoisie. It has simply assumed that
their interests are identical, and it has therefore tended to
conflate the one with the other, either explicitly ("Matanzima ..
functioning as the representative (and leader) of the
collaborationist bourgeoisie") or by proceeding as if it were the
" Extensively analysed in another historical context by Helen
Bradford, A Taste of Freedom (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 198 ) .
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bourgeoisie rather than the homeland leadership who were the
immediate clients of the South African state ("this emergent petty-
bourgeoisie was marked out by Pretoria as a future subordinate
ally, whose function would be to preside over the bantustan
state.11)58
This unthinking identification of the homeland leadership and
the homeland bourgeoisie is both theoretically and empirically
incorrect. It is theoretically incorrect, because no state can be
reduced to the instrument of a particular class; certainly not in
Africa where, as Leys has pointed out, the essence of a
'bonapartist' government is its ability to maintain itself in
power, despite its lack of a firm class base, by juggling the
CO
interests of the various conflicting classes. It is empirically
incorrect because the overwhelming majority of the homeland leaders
were not petty bourgeois but chiefs, and chiefs are not part of the
middle classes, they are part of the state apparatus.60 Thereby
hangs a tale.
Innes and O'Meara, "Class Formation," p.85; Southall, South
Africa's Transkei, p. 142. For an even more extreme formulation, see
Molteno, "Historical Significance," p.25.
C. Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya (London: Heinemann
Educational Books, 1975), pp. 207-9.
It is symptomatic of the conceptual confusion in homeland
studies that Southall, the most detailed of all the homeland
analysts, discusses the chiefs under the heading, "the Transkeian
bourgeoisie; chiefs and politicians." South Africa * s Transkei,
p.173.
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Chiefs in the South African homelands, as elsewhere in Africa
during the colonial period, have long depended on the government
rather than their people for both political recognition and
financial support. They can not be regarded as a 'traditional *
ruling class because they have entirely ceased to represent the
dominated remnants of the precolonial social order, although this
fact has been deliberately obscured for ideological purposes. In
South Africa, it is even questionable whether chiefs can be viewed
as a social class at all, or whether they should simply be
categorised as state functionaries like magistrates and policemen.
Certainly, the chiefs who rose to prominence under the homeland
dispensation were not the great hereditary aristocrats such as Ring
Sabata Dalindyebo of the Thembu, but junior chiefs such as Kaiser
Matanzima, Lucas Mangope and Gatsha Buthelezi, who depended on the
South African connection not only for money and power, but even for
their very status as chiefs. Lennox Sebe, who was not a born chief
but had a chieftainship manufactured for him on the basis of a fake
genealogy, is an extreme example of this process.
The incipient middle classes were barely consulted when they
newly established homelands were instituted with built-in chiefly
dominance, as in the Transkei Parliament where chiefly members
outnumbered elected members 64 to 45. And even though their numbers
burgeoned as the homelands flourished, their political influence
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did not increase.61 Attempts by the middle classes to gain
political power were cynically suppressed with the connivance of
the South African authorities, as happened in Venda in 1978 when
the opposition party won the majority of Parliamentary seats but
were locked up together with the electoral officers by Chief
Patrick Mphephu. Political institutions which might have
incorporated middle class aspirations, such as political parties
and homeland parliaments, either became instruments of homeland
patronage or died out altogether. The homeland bourgeoisie do not
control, and are not even faithfully represented in, the homeland
administrations, which are dominated by chiefs and are part of a
state apparatus which is centred not in the homeland itself but in
Pretoria.
To say that the homeland leaders are part of the South African
state apparatus is not to imply that they are mere puppets or that
they form part of a bureaucratic command structure. Such overt
subordination to the white government would have destroyed the
ideological legitimacy which the entire homeland system was geared
to create. Homeland administrations therefore adopted a patrimonial
style, patrimonialism being defined by Weber as "any kind of
government that is organised as a more or less direct extension of
61
 The four homelands of the Eastern Transvaal - Lebowa,
KaNgwane, KwaNdebele and possibly Gazankulu - seem to be an
exception to this generalisation.
41
the ruler's household." It is very personal style of government
that is widespread in neo-colonial black Africa, and has the
ideological advantage of seeming similar to precolonial chiefly
rule.
Patrimonial government habitually makes use of "clientilist"
networks, by which patrons distribute material resources to their
clients in exchange for political loyalty.63 The concept of
clientilism is very useful for an understanding of the homeland
segment of the South African state. The homeland leadership is
neither the the puppet of the South African state, nor does it
present the interests of the homeland bourgeoisie. Rather it is
the intermediate link between the two in a clientilist chain of
authority. This conception helps us to understand how the homeland
leadership remains subordinate to the South African state but yet
preserves some relative autonomy. It also explains how a local
bourgeoisie is able to benefit from homeland self-government
without acquiring any commitment to the homeland leadership. The
Transkei bourgeoisie saw Kaiser Matanzima as a patron rather than
Quoted in T. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in
Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press,
1984), p.69.
63
 On clientilism, see for example R. Jackson and C. Rosberg,
Personal Rule in Black Africa (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1982), pp.38-47.
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as a representative of their class interests. Once he had fallen
from power and could no longer deliver the goods, they lost
interest in him and transferred their service to his successor.
The clientilist relationship was absolutely necessary for the
preervation of homeland legitimacy, but it also suited the
convenience of the South African state in other ways. First of all,
it reduced the relationship between the state and the black rural
masses to a relationship, relatively easy to manipulate, between
the South African authorities and individual homeland
functionaries. A second characteristic of clientage is that its
most important transactions take place in secret, thus enabling the
homeland authorities to concur privately in measures which they
could not publicly approve, particularly with regard to state
security. Lastly, the clientilist relationship involved
substantial government contracts, which set up innumerable fringe
benefits for the South African functionaries who actually conducted
the day to day business between South Africa and the various
homelands. It should also be remembered that the homelands were a
relatively specialised but low priority issue within the South
African state's hierarchy of concerns. This allowed comparatively
unimportant but specialised local agencies such as JALC to exert an
influence out of all proportion to their lowly ranking within the
structure of the South African state.
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The disadvantages to the South African government of the
clientilist chain of command were not perceived while things were
running smoothly, but became all too apparent under pressure. Too
much depended on the individual personality of the homeland leader.
However pliable he might appear to be, a crisis might show him up
as too old (Kaiser Matanzima}, too corrupt (George Matanzima) or
too incompetent (Lennox Sebe). Even worse, there were no
institutionalised methods of replacing an unsuitable homeland
leader. Bourgeois institutions had been much attenuated by
patrimonial neglect, and were liable to throw up undesirable
candidates (Stella Sigcau). Second-ranking homeland functionaries
might be assassinated (like Fiet Ntuli, the over-zealous KwaNdebele
Minister of Justice in 198 ), but the leaders themselves were
surrounded by bodyguards (Holomisa has survived three assassination
plots). Military coups, engineered with the help of Military
Intelligence, seemed the most appropriate and practical answer. But
as Bantu Holomisa and Oupa Gqozo have demonstrated, albeit in very
different ways, military coups do not necessarily provide the kind
of person whom the South African state wants. The lesson of the
homeland implosions for the South African government seems to be
that government by remote control is simply not reliable.
The disjuncture between the homeland state apparatus and the
homeland bourgeoisie is not necessarily permanent. It is entirely
possible under the present circumstances that the homeland
bourgeoisie might capture the local state apparatus. Indeed they
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are well placed to do so, provided that they can refurbish homeland
institutions to become properly representative of the middle
classes. Once this has occurred there is no institutional reason
why a bourgeois homeland leadership should not opt for the ANC
rather than President de Klerk if it feels that the ANC is better
placed to satisfy its class aspirations. Something of this sort
already appears to be happening in the poorly documented Eastern
Transvaal homelands of KwaNdebele, KaNgwane, Lebowa and Gazankulu.
But a homeland administration which serves the bourgeoisie
does not necessarily serve the interests of the impoverished rural
masses. This is apparent from the tension which has developed
betwen the Inkatha-style bourgeois-based political movements in
KwaNdebele, KaNgwane and Gazankulu and the mass-based local
branches of the ANC inside these homelands. This situation poses a
problem for the ANC and an _nppm I mi i ly for the South African
government, which is better placed to satisfy the short-term
economic appetites of the homeland bourgeoisie. Whichever way the
bourgeoisie eventually tilts, however, it is clear that the
distinctive state apparatus of the homelands have failed in their
mission, and will gradually be phased out. Inasmuch as homeland
structures may continue to exist, they will survive mainly as
sinecures for the homeland bourgeoisie; as instruments of political
control, they are clearly dead on their feet.
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